Whither science advice

Published on September 13th, 2024

The International Network for Governmental Science Advice (INGSA) was formed in 2014 under the sponsorship of the International Council of Science’s (ICSU, now the International Science Council (ISC)). Over 220 practitioners and academics at the science-policy interface from more than 40 countries, both developing and developed, attended an inaugural meeting in Auckland. The discussion focused on identifying the issues that challenged the provision of effective science advice to governments, a process which was very patchy across the globe. Ten years later, INGSA held its fifth global conference in Kigali, Rwanda.

INGSA has evolved into a broad network focused on capacity building at the science-policy interface in both the developed and developing world. Its centrepiece activities are workshops conducted on every continent where policymakers and scientists jointly engage in exploring the science-policy interface. It has regional chapters in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, and special interest groups on parliamentary science advice and science diplomacy. 

When INGSA was formed, the focus was on what principles, mechanisms and approaches were desirable if science was to better assist governments in making decisions. Relatively few countries had formal processes linking science to executive decision-making. The need to do so was still debated. The purpose of science advice is primarily to convey an analysis of the evidence and its implications recognising that policymakers always have options in addressing any issue, including doing nothing. The distinct role of science advice in emergencies was emphasised as it placed the scientist more directly within the decision-making process.  

The discourse evolved from rather hubristic formulations such as ‘evidence-based’ to ‘evidence-informed’. Discussion acknowledged the limits of science, avoiding scientific hubris, confronting policy hubris, and the need to sustain the trust of politicians, policymakers, the public and the science community.  But importantly, the role was not as being a lobbyist for more research funds. 

It was useful to distinguish between evidence synthesis and evidence brokerage. Evidence synthesis requires an analysis of the knowledge derived from a range of disciplines and perspectives needed to address a question. But the formality, scale and shape of evidence synthesis can vary enormously; for example, between that very formal set of processes used in academic public health to the more informal synthesis often used in rapid decision-making within policy communities.

Evidence brokerage recognises that policymakers do not have the luxury of waiting until the science is complete (it never is). Brokerage requires being clear about the uncertainties, what science cannot answer, what are the unknowns and the inferential gap between what is known and what is concluded. The purpose of brokerage is to identify the options for a government and the implications from a scientific perspective of each option.

Governments do not want problems identified, but rather solutions that are feasible, scalable and compatible with their political ideology. That demands skilled diplomacy by scientists working at the interface. The importance of not claiming expertise regarding the non-scientific dimensions that belong to society, policymakers and politicians was emphasised.   

It is also important to distinguish between what science advice means when it is informing executive decision-making by governments, whether national or subnational, from that in the multilateral space where the potential for executive function is much more limited. Thus, in the multilateral space, science advice tends to be that of evidence synthesis rather than brokerage. This is most evident in the large-scale assessments such as the IPCC. Exceptions are the UN agencies with more operational roles (e.g. WHO, FAO, UNEP) which have chief scientists and well developed consultative mechanisms. But in the politically focused structures (e.g. UN General Assembly) any scientific input depends mainly on the strength of domestic science advisory processes reaching into the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. 

The optimal nature of science advisory mechanisms remains unresolved because of cultural and constitutional differences. Anglophone countries had largely adopted a model where science advice was provided directly by a chief science advisor; they had vital input in crisis management. Particularly in Europe, there was a reluctance to conferring such responsibility to an individual, preferring that science advice should be provided by a committee. This limits the capacity of scientific advice to be directly accessible to the chief executive of a government.

Yet experience suggests that the most influential interactions are not those of writing expert-informed reports but rather those informal discussions with politicians and policymakers at different points across the policy process. This requires trust and integrity. And no science advisor is ever an individual: their validity and effectiveness depend on networks reaching into academia and, in many cases, a group of departmental science advisors. 

Covid exposed the importance of science advice on one hand and yet many issues in its practice on the other. The integrity of advice was damaged by political claims such as “we are following the science’ as an excuse for manifestly political decisions. Several limitations were noted: the lack of performed processes, hubris that restricted the range of disciplinary inputs narrowing the advice needed; and an unwillingness to admit to uncertainties given that the science was still evolving. There were also enormous barriers on the political side when ideology and domestic and global politics dominated over science. The ISC produced a report after extensive consultation on the policy implications and lessons from Covid.

Even before Covid struck, attitudes to science were changing. Social media, disinformation and popularism all played a role. But relativistic arguments also emerged as sciences variously grappled with the interface with other knowledge systems, particularly Indigenous and local knowledge.  Trust in elites including science was falling (albeit less so than in other institutions). Science is of no value if it is not trusted. But the skills of communication to policy makers and politicians are not necessarily the same as those of public communication.

The architecture of science advice must remain a core focus for INGSA. There are issues both in supply and demand, and barriers created by the limited views of science advice by some policy makers. The scope of advice is now much broader than the security dimensions from whence science advice first emerged more than 75 years ago. It becomes more complex as science advice extends into socially orientated domains. Two related challenges emerge. The first is systems complexity – many of the problems governments are expected to address involve interacting and open systems. Such problems require understandings of systems complexity, multiple actions across multiple domains and science must be integrated with the policy and political realities. Secondly: how should science relate to other knowledge systems and values-based considerations in policy making? It is a sensitive matter and one in which understandings are still evolving. Certainly, an advisory mechanism must be aware of other perspectives, but such integration belongs to society and decision makers. Indeed, it can be argued that conflating science with other ways of knowing undermines science advice’s utility and credibility.  This is not to suggest that other world views are not important or relevant to the policymaker, and they are certainly critical to citizens and societies, but conflation of knowledge systems is unrealistic, unwise and confusing.

Science has a core and essential role in assisting decision makers to understand their options and thus to make "better” decisions - acknowledging that what defines ‘better’ is a values judgement. In an era when existential risks ranging from declining social cohesion to conflict to climate change are rising and where technological, natural and social sciences can contribute critically to nearly every decision a government can and should make, it is important that we remain focused on invigorating science advice. Covid, populism, post-modernism, relativism, and disinformation have undermined trust in science, and this is a challenge to addressing the many issues all societies are facing. Indeed, these very issues are infecting the policy process itself.

Is science advice less assured than a decade ago?  It certainly has not progressed as many had hoped. We must stay focused on improving the pathways to enhance its utility and value. INGSA as part of the ISC family has a critical role to play.

[1] Gluckman, P. Policy: The art of science advice to government. Nature 507, 163–165 (2014).

[2] Gluckman, P.D., Bardsley, A. & Kaiser, M. 2021 Brokerage at the science–policy interface: from conceptual framework to practical guidance. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 8, 84. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00756-3

[3] Douglas H 2009 Science, policy and the value free ideal. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh

[4] Cairney P 2015 The politics of evidence -based policy making Palgrave Pivot London

[5] International Science Council, 2023. Unprecedented & Unfinished: Policy Lessons and Recommendations from COVID-19 – 2nd edition, Paris, France, International Science Council. DOI: 10.24948/2023.03.

[6] Gluckman P 2023: science and science systems; beyond semantics: https://policylabs.frontiersin.org/content/commentary-science-and-science-systems-beyond-semantics